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Corporate Rescue: 
This Year， N ext Year ••• 
Philip Smart and Charles Booth out1ine those issues that they 
believe need to be addressed before the government seeks to 
re-introduce to LegCo a new Part IVB of the Companies 
Ordinance dea1ing with corporate rescue 
Themedhr tい nactlllentof a 
statutory corporδte rescue 
mcchanism has long been debated in 
Hong Kong insolvency law circlcs 
That debatc 仁川1einto sharp focus in 
Janllary this year upon thc gazetting 
of the仁ompanics(Amendment) Bil 
2000. The Bil envisages， inter alia， a 
new Part IVB (アrovisionalSupervision 
and Voluntary Arrangements') for 
the Companies Ordinancc (Cap 32). 
Part IVB contains some 33 (often 
intricate) sections broadly designed 
a10ng the lines of the October 1996 
rccommcndations of the Law Reform 
Commission of Hong Kong (the Law 
l~eform COlllmission) in its Report on 
Corporate Rcsclle and Insolvent 
Trading (the Rcport). 
Despite near universal recognition 
that an effective corporate rescue 
mechanism is needed il1 Hong Kong， 
the provisionaI supervision regime as 
proposed has encountercd serious 
criticism， with the rεsult that it now 
appears that Paτt IVB will be cut from 
thc current 1egislative programmc 
and hcld over untiI after the LegCo 
clcctions. The purposc of this article is 
not to review the background to， or 
the content of， Part IVB (for such a 
rcview， scc Bannisler， 'Staying Alivc 
in Hong Kong: A Comparativc 
H.eview' (2000) 16 lns L&P 17)， but 
rather to identify those issues that we 
believe must b巳 addresse正1by the 
governl11ent before Part rVB is re-
inlroduced 10 LcgCo司tsomc later dalc. 
Secured Creditors: 
General Rights 
A centraI part of the proposed 
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provisional supervision regime is 
the l11oratorium: once provisionaI 
supervision has begun， creditors will 
be unab1e to enforce their rights against 
thc company by the usual means (eg 
civil町 tions，distress， winding-up 
proceedings， etc). A narrow1y defined 
category of secured creditor -known 
as a 'major creditor' -is by s 168ZQ to 
have a veto over the continuation of 
any provisional supervision. Section 
168ZQ and the vcto are discussed 
furthcr be1ow， but this part of the 
analysis deals with the genera1 rights 
of secured creditors， in particular， 
wherc the veto power has not ariscn 
or has not been exercised by a major 
creditor. 
The position in the United 
Kingdol11 and Australia (as welI as in 
the United Statcs) is that the rights of 
securcd creditors are given extensive 
protection in a corporate rescue. 1n 
these three jurisdictions， no rescue 
proposa1 that substantially cuts into 
the right日ofa secured creditor can be 
forced upon that creditor without its 
consent (with the exception that in the 
United States， a〆cramdown'procedure 
may be used， pursuant to which a 
proposal can be forced upon an 
objccti時 orimpaired class of sccured 
creditor only if it is demonstraled that 
the p1an docs not 'discriminate 
llnfairly' and is 'fair and equitable' 
with respect to each such class of 
secured creditor) 
Surprisingly， a rcauing of Part rVB 
revcals tha t in the Bill there is no 
provision th日tprevents creditors from 
passing a proposal that impairs the 
rights of secured creditors without 
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securing their consent. Crcditors vote 
as a single class and a majority in 
number and two-thirds in value of Ihe 
creditors present in person or by proxy 
(and voting on the resolution) is 
sufficient to carry a proposal. For 
exal11ple， itappears that a majority of 
creditors who collectively hold 70% 
of the corporate debt could pass a 
proposal that al creditors (secured and 
unsecured alike) should release 80% 
of their debt and acccpt 20% payable 
by thc company over three years. ln 
the light of the level of dividend 
typicaIly paid in a winding up， the 
sort of proposal in the above example 
would be quite attra仁tiveto unsecured 
creditors; for a properly secured 
creditor， itcould well be a disaster. 
When questions were put (by one 
of these authors) to the government as 
to whether， as in the above example， a 
proposal cou1d be passed against the 
wishes of a secured creditor requiring 


























response was sillIヲlf' - just such a I substar 
scenario had always been intended I circurr 
under thc proposed Part IVB. 11 our I demon 
view， the incorporation of such a I secured 
premise into prov 凶 ona1 s叩up戸e川 SlO叩n1 un江111ぜ由制t削a創1凶rl
wou1d have revolutionary I would 
conseque町 esfor bank lending in I plan 
Hong Kong. For instance， a ba叫くmight
take a perfectly valid fixed or floating j Secun: 
charge， expe仁ti時 thatin the event of I Even as 
a winding u p (or following the 1 10 prev¥ 
appointment of a receiver) the bank I that afj 
would be ab1c to recovcr most， if not 1 creditOJ 
alI， of its debt. But under proposed I of that正
Part IVB (assuming a bank's 1031川 I-albeit 
not substantial enough to give the bank I relatior 
a veto power)， a町 thi時 mighthappen， I co町 err
and the bank might ultimate1y be I to仁erta
forc吋 totake a haircut on account oi i the con 
the voting power of the unsecured I supervi 
creditors. Accordingly， when taking I Und 
security the ba出 wouldhave had no I rescue r 
idea wh昌tposition it might be in a I charge ( 
few years down the road， should I whole 0 
the company go into provisional I a〆oneti 
supervision. That risk would have 10 I the floa 
be factored into thc costs of corpo凶 ej very ou 





























The idea of secured creditors being 
forced by a plan to take a haircut was 
never suggested， let alone discussed， 
by the Law Reform Commission in the 
Report. 1n fact， our understanding is 
that the intention of the Law Reform 
Commission was just the opposite， in 
that no plan that modified or otherwise 
affected the rights of a secured creditor 
could be approved unless the secured 
creditor consented to the proposed 
modification or impairment. It is 
unfortunate that the Report did not 
fully address this point. At this stage， 
however， itis clear that undermining 
secured creditors' rights， as does the 
proposed Part 1VB， isfar too high a 
price to pay for the introduction of 
any corporate rescue mechanism目
Rather， we would suggest a solution 
that mediates between the contrasting 
approaches of the Report and the Bil 
-the consent o[ a se仁uredcreditor 
should bc required to any proposed 
modification or impairment of its 
substantive rights， except in those 
circumstances where it can be 
demonstrated to the court that the 
secured creditor is not being treated 
unfairly and the extent of its recovery 



































































































































Secured Creditors: Veto Power 
Even assuming that the BiI1 is modified 
to prevent the approval of a proposal 
that affects the rights of a secured 
creditor except with the concurrence 
of that creditor， there remains another 
-albei t less crucial -problem area in 
:relation to secured creditors. This 
!concerns the right given by s 168ZQ 
10 certain secured creditors to veto 
;Ihe continuation of the prov凶 onal
jSUp己rVlslon.
Under the English and Australian 
;rescuεregimes， the holder of a floating 
ilcharge over the whole or substant凶 Iy
iwho1e of the company's assets is given 
f山町 timeonly' veto power: in cffec七
l~e floating charge holder can at the 
:陀ryoutset opt to bring the procedure 




(Report， paras 13.7 to 13.17) suggested 
a similar veto power whilst (a) 
recommending that the veto also be 
extended to fixed charge holders and 
(b) noting that， at least in England， 
some lenders had begun taking a 
f10ating charge mcrely to obtain a veto 
in the event the borrower subsequently 
went into administration (the so-called 
'light-weight'正loatingcharge issue). 
Both these points have been taken up 
in s 168ZQ. 
Section 168ZQ(1) requires the 
provisional supervisor within three 
days of the appointment to give 
relevant notice to each of the 
company' s 'major cred i tors'. The 
notice requires the major creditor， 
within the earlier of either three days 
of receiving the notice or seven days 
of the 'relevant date' (ie the day 
provisional supervision commences)， 
to inform the provision丘1supervisor 
whether the crcditor agrees to the 
continuation of the provisional 
supervision. A major creditor is 
defined in s 168ZQ(5) as 
'.. the holder of a charge over 
the whole or substantially 
the whole of the company's 
property if， bu t onl y if， the 
c1aim under the charge amounts 
to not less than 331/3% of the 
liabilities of the company 
immediately before the relevant 
date.' 
The reference to 3313'>'0 of the 
total liabilities of the company 
may， itis suggested， at times place 
a near impossible administrative 
burden upon thc provisional 
su pervlsor. 
lt may prove difficult in many cases 
to ascertain within this short period 
whether or not there is a major creditor 
as defined in s 168ZQ(5). Of course， 
there will be cases where it is quite 
plain that thcre are not any Illajor 
creditors， but there are bound to be 
other cases where it is a grey area. For 
example， would it be possible in a 
BCCHK type of situ孔tionto ascertain 
the tot礼1liabilitics of the comp孔ny
within three days of the appointment 
of a provisional supervisor? Similar 
difficulties will arise in cases involving 
a group of colllpanies， sOllle of which 
are solvent and sOllle insolvent， wherc 
cross-guarantees havc been given， and 
where the tot丘1Iiabilities of the 
company may not be immediately 
apparent. There may also be cases 
where the company's accounts are 
l1lissing， inadequatc， or even a work 
of fiction. Final1y， even where thc 
provisional supervisor canλscertain 
the liabilities， there may be a not 
inconsiderable cost factor -one that 
simply does not exist， for example， in 
England or Australia目 Theprovisional 
supervisor would， in any cvent， have 
more constructive things to do in the 
early days of his or her appointment 
than ascertain the percent且gesof 
overall corporatc debt owed to secured 
cr以:li tors 
Another qucstion is: Why should 
thc percentage be fixed at 331/3%? This 
question is relevant because if a 
creditor holds one-third of the total 
debt， no proposal can in any event 
pass on a vote of the creditors without 
his or her approval. lt should also not 
be overlooked that in reality， as not al 
creditors will turn up and vote at the 
creditors' Illeeting (or might turn up 
and abstain)， itmay well be possible 
for a creditor holding significantly less 
than 331/3% of the total debt to block 
the ultilllate approval of any proposal. 
It would therefore be foolhardy for a 
provisional supervisor to proceed with 
a plan if a 口editorholding， let us say 
20%， of thc total debt wereθctively 
opposed. 
lt is suggested that the 331/3% 
(or incleed any other perc日ntag巳)
requirement in s 168ZQ(5) l1light 
cause l1lore harm than good and 
should be abandoned 
Workers' Wages 
Whilst there is authoritv that 'the 
wages of sin is dcath' (Romans 6・23)，
there remains a question as to whether ~ 
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the exlraordinary (if not actually 
sinful) way in which workers' wages 
are dealt wi th under the Bil will be 
the death of provisional supcrvisioll 
1n contrast to the position of secured 
creditors， which， as noted above， has 
been undermined， workers， in our 
view， are being treated far・too
generously. Our objections arc aimed 
not at the treatment of workcrs' claims 
arising during the course of a 
provisional supervision， but rather at 
the treatment of their pre-existing 
claims 
Whcre a company is insolvent and 
a winding-up petition has been 
presented， workers who h司venot 
receivcd their wages can apply to the 
Protection of Wages on Jnsolvency 
Fund (PW1F) for ex gratia payments目
(The same is also the case in relョtiOIl
to severance payments， which can be 
quite substantial.) The Law Reform 
Comlllission originally proposed that 
the onset of provisional supervision 
shollld likeれrisetrigger the operation 
of tht、PW1F(Report， para 5.42). 
However， concerns were expressed 
that unscrupulous elllpJoyers might 
lay off employees without pαyingthem 
thcir巳ntitlcmentsand then put the 
company into provisional supervision 
thereby， so it was said， passing the 
burden of unpaid wages and severance 
paylllents onto the PW1F. (See the 1999 
ConslIltation Paper atくhttp://www.
info.gov.hk/ fsb / consult/ index.htm>) 
There was also some concern as to the 
potential adverse consequence on the 
solvency of the PれT1Fif there were 
a great nllmber uf provisiunal 
supervisions commencedョfterthε 
enactment of the ncw procedllres. A 
consultation exercise was conducted 
in 1998 and a Consultation Paper 
issued in February 1999， as a result of 
，¥ァhichthe Bill has now been drafted 
(日巳es 168ZA(c)) in such a wav that 
provision丘 supervision仁川1 only 
commence if the company has either 
(1) paid off al debts司ndliabilities 
owing to its employees under the 
Employment Ordinance (仁ap57) as 
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of the relevant date or (2) has opened 
a trust account with a bank containing 
sufficient funds to pay off al such 
debts and !iabilities: pursuant to 
s Hi8ZA(c)(iv)(A)(II) (1'eally!)， the 
'excl usive purpose' of the trust accou日t
is to pay such debts正mdliabilities. 
Whilst the PWIF and cmployees' 
groups will doubtless welcome the 
approach taken in the Bil， very real 
difficulties have been created. Firstly， 
and this is a point recognised in the 
1999 Consultation Paper itself， wherc 
is a company -which is already in 
serious financial difficulty -going to 
find the money to pay off all its 
liabilities to its employees or to 
establish the relevant trust account? It 
is unlikely that banks would be keen 
to lend such sums to the company， 
knowing that the loan would go 
straight to the workers and would not 
be used in the company's trading 
business. (Moreover， a lender in such 
circumstances would not receive any 
sort of priority 01' preferential status 
in the provisional supervision， unlike 
in a liquidation where a bank has 
previously lent money to a company 
to pay its workers: see s 265(2) of the 
亡。mpaniesOrdinance.) There is also 
the surely undesirable likelihoud that 
a company contempl司tingp1'ovisional 
supervision might stop making any 
effort to pay its trade creditors and 
hoa1'd as much cash as possible in 
order to get together a sufficient lump 
sum to pay off its employees. It is fair 
to say that the Bil actively encourages 
the company deliberately to create 
what in an ordinary liquidation wou!d 
be considered an unfair preference 
And whilst the employees may benefit， 
there is undoubtedly a corresponding 
det1'iment to the general body of 
creditors -which is， of course， why 
insohアencylaw has孔lwaysfound 
preferences objectionable as呂 matter
lf principle. The detrimentれアouldbe 
even more objectionable in those cases 
where the employees being benefit自:l
happen to include directors or other 
'associates' who are owed sums under 
their service contracts with the 
company. 
A further matter related to the 
comp孔ny'sestablishment of a trust 
account is that the Billleaves it unclear 
as to what should happen to the funds 
if the provisional supervision collapses 
in its early stages， or the creditors 
ultimately 1'eject the proposal at their 
meeting， and the company thereupon 
goes into liquidation目 Wecannot 
believe that the intention is that， for 
example， if the provisional supervision 
implodes in its first week， the 
employees should stil be paid in ful 
out of the trust account. The fact that 
it is termed a 'trust account' does not 
mean that the cmployees are 
beneficiarics under a classic trust: at 
most there would be a so-called 
Quistclose trust -a trust for a purpose 
-and the money should revert to the 
company upon the failure of the 
provisional supervision. 
The situation is even more 
problematical where the empJoyees 
have actually been paid off upon the 
company entering into provisional 
supervision (rather than a trust 
account having been established). It 
appears that there is no way in which 
these payments might be recovered， 
even w here the provisional 
supervision is given up as hopeless 
after a day or two. The payment to the 
employees would not in any 
subsequent winding up be an unfair 
preference under s 266B of the 
Companies Ordinance， because the 
directors' lI10tive in making the 
payments to the employees wou!d 
have been to enable the company to 
enter into provisional supervision 
rather than to confer an advantage to 
the employees (see Rc MC Bacoll Ltd 
[1990] BCC 78). 
A purely practical objection is that， 
in circumstances where a company has 
many employees， the (proposed) 
provisional supervisor might have to 
spend considerable time， before 
even being able to commence the 
provisional supervision， working out 










































the al the debts and liabilities owed to 
employees and former employees 
(which will likely be even more 
time consuming than working out 
the amounts owed to secured 
creditors). As there is no limit or cap 
laid down in the Bill， 'al debts and 
liabilities' would mean precisely th日t.
At least if a maximum amount (or 
amounts) were specified (as under the 
Protection of Yヘlageson 1nsolvency 
Ordinance (Cap 380))， the 
ascertainment-of-liabili ty exercise 
would be that much simpler and less 
costly. 
Lastly， itmust also be noted that 
the Protection ofいTageson Jnsolvency 
Ordinance has a distorting effect on 
Hong Kong insolvency law， which 
provisional supervision will only make 
worse. Section 16 of that Ordinance 
defines insolvency in relation to a 
company as meaning the presentation 
of a winding up petition: it does not 
encompass a creditors' voluntary 
liquidation or receivership (or the 
appointment of a provisional 
supervisor). The position of employees 
in respect of unpaid wages is set out 
in the following table (similar 









































































































































Jt is instructive to compare the 
position in England under thc 
Employment Rights Act 1996， s 182 
to 190. 1nsolvency of a corporate 
employer is defined (as it was under 
the 1978 legislation， as amended) as 
meaning the making of a winding-up 
order， the passing of a resolution for 
voluntary liquidation， the 
appointment of a receiver， thc making 
of日nadministration order or the 
approval of a company voluntary 
arrangement (a 'CV A') -and any of 
these may trigger an application for 
payment of an identical amount from 
the relevant fund. 1n England many 
corporate rescues takc place within 
reccivcrship and there is no incentive 
for the employees to seek to put the 
company into liquidation (in order to 
get more out of the statutory fund). 
Jn other words， commercial 
considerations will determine 
whether to move ahead with a rescuc 
or restructuring and whethcr 
receivership or administration (or 
a CV A) is the appropriate vehicle 
1n Hong Kong， ifthe Bil is enacted， 
workers will dcvelop a 'wish list' 
along the following lines: 
• First， provisional supervision -the 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• Third， recei vership or credi tors' 
volunt孔rywinding up -tbe 
workers will get孔 priority under 
thc亡。mp丘niesOrdinance 
• Lastly， other procedures， such as 
informal workouts or workouts 
under the joint guidelines issued 
by the Hong Kong Monetary 
Associationょmdthe Hong Kong 
Ass山 jationof Bank日 (whichare 
known 孔s the Hong Kong 
Approach to Corporate Difficulties) 
-workcrs wiU get no guaranteιi 
payment or pnonty 
We find the policy underlying the 
operation of the PWIF 立tbes t 
inconsist巳nt.(This is p川 tl仁11訂 ly80 
when it is noted that no provision is 
made in the existing legislation for 
workers' wagεs should the employer 
he an individl1al who makes a proposal 
for an individl1al voluntary 
arrangement (an 'IV A') under the 
B丘nkruptcyOrdinance， although we 
acknowledge that， in practice， IV As 
involving employers would bc highly 
unusual and involve only孔 few
workers.) 1n short， the PWIF is already 
distorting H印 19Kong insolvency Iaw， 
not to mcntion encouraging othぜrwise
avoidable costs (by encouraging 
unnecessary winding l1p pctitions)， 
日ndthe Bil would simply aggrav丘te
thδt position日tthc direct expensc of 
the general body of creditors. We 
believe that， at a minimum， workers' 
unpaid claims pre-dating the 
commencement of昌 prllvisional
supervision should be treated thc same 
as workers' claims pre-d司tingthe 
commencement of a compulsory 
windin日up.An even better solution 
would be to adopt the English 
approach and mandate thじ sanle
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there is a general lack uf仁onfidence
amongst creditors in the proposed 
provisional supervision regime. lt 
must not be forgotten that many 
people and cumpanies have been hurt 
in the recent recession and there may 
be something of an anti-debtor reaction 
taking place -creditors are wary that 
somehow unscrllplllous directors may 
be able to manipulate the proposed 
regime to 'get 0“， without P可 ing
'their' debts. Certainly， the startling 
lack of success of IV As in the last two 
years indicates that statutory debt 
restructuring mechanisms are not 
necessariJy regarded by creditors as a 
pan白cea.(The legislatiun governing 
person孔1insolvency in England and 
Hung Kong is essentially the same， yet 
whereas in England for roughly every 
five bankruptcies there is one IV A， in 
Hong Kong， since the new bankruptcy 
law came into operation on 1 April 
1998， roughly 4，900 bankruptcy orders 
have been made， blt unly seven IV As 
have been appruved.) 
We wuuld suggest that confidence 
would be greateτin a systel1l that 'fits 
in' with the existing insolvency regime. 
The way in which the Bil deals with 
buth secured creditors and employees 
changes the balance of (competing) 
interests that has hitherto existed in 
Hong Kong insolvency law. The way 
in which the Bill approaches the 
directors is also， it is submitted， 
u!1lnsplfJng 
Where a company has gone into 
liquiιlation， the liquidator is given 
certain additional sulヲstantiverights 
01" procedural advantages to bring the 
directors to book. The仁omp品nies
Ordinance contains provisions relating 
to unfair preferences， extortionate 
c1'edit transactions， fraudulent trading 
and misfeasance proceedings (and 
transactions at an unde1'value will be 
added in due仁ourse). The Report 
failed to recommend th日tavoidance 
powers should be conferred upon a 
provisional supervisor， with the 
exception of the ability (for the 
purposes of the s 168ZQ veto power) 
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to avoid fixed and floating charges 
created by an insolvent company 
within 12 months of the 
ωmmencement of provisional 
supervision， except to the extent of (1) 
the amount of any cash paid to the 
company at the time of or subsequent 
to the creation of， and in consideration 
for， the charge， and (2) interest (see 
Report， para 13.19.) This 
recommendation was incorporated 
into proposed s 168ZQ(4). 
It is our underst昌ndingthat the 
failure to extend unfair preferences 
to provisional supervision was 
deliberate， for the Law Reform 
Commission feJt that the existence 
of avoidance powers would be a 
disincentive for directors deciding 
whether to put their company into 
provisional supervision; and， in 
addition， that it would be difficult to 
exercise avoidance powers within the 
time periods contemplated for 
provisional supervision. Three 
obscrvations may be made in regarJ 
to this omission. First， the presence of 
avoidance powers would not be a 
disincentive as far as honest and 
upright directors are concerned; a 
disincentive would only be present for 
directors whose conduct would not 
bcar cart話ulscrutiny. (It is perhaps 
unnecessary to ask whcther this latter 
group of directors is deserving of such 
ωnsideration on the part of the Law 
Reform仁ommission.)Second， even if 
the appIication of unfair preference 
powers could not be completed during 
a provisional supervision， the me1'e 
ability to exercise such powers would 
change the relative bargaining 
strengths of the parties. Third， whilst 
the absencc of avoidancc powers might 
be an incentive for directors， itcannot 
help build confidence in creditors who 
are afraid of unscrupulous directors 
Although it is arguable that leaving 
礼voidance powers outside the 
provisional supervision regime iyil 
streamline the process and promote a 
more efficient administration by the 
provisional supervisor， se¥'eral points 
can be l1lade in rebuttal. First， if th巴
facts do not raise any suggestion of 
impropriety -as wiIl be the case in the 
overwhelming majority of instances 
then the mere presence of avoidance 
powcrs wilI be neither here nor there， 
as there wiII be nothing to pursue. The 
absence of avoidance powers will 
reaIly be relevant to saving costs where 
the facts are downright suspicious 
Second， although there are no 
avoidance powers (with the limited 
exception noted above in regard to 
charges)， the BilI does require (by an 
amendment to the existing s 1681) the 
provisional supervisor (just like a 
liquidator) to report any unfit conduct 
to the Official Receiver for the 
purpose of directors' disqualification 
proceedings - so cIearIy， the 
provisional supervisor cannot simply 
imitate Lord Nelson when it comes， 
for example， to a director who has 
conferred a preference upon an 
associate or committed a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Lastly， and most 
importantly， thc provisional 
supervisor wiII have to teII the 
creditors what they might expect to 
recover under the rescue plan and， in
comparison， what they might expect 
in a normal liquidation -and in a 
liquidation， avoidance powers vヘlil
apply. The point is welI put in the 
folIowing passage by an English 
banker: 
creditors would want very 
specific assurances that any 
monies which have been unfairly 
disbursed by the company will 
be recovered by the supervisor 
for the general body of 
unsecured creditors.仁ertainly
the creditors wiI not agree to 
preferences， undervalues， etc 
being forgotten when such 
transactions could be vigorously 
attacked by a liquidator in a 
winding up situation目， (Eales， 
111solvency: A PrncticllI Lcgal 
H山尚ookfor Mllllngcrs (1996) 
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We believc that rela tively few 
successful rescucs will takεplace 
under any statutory rescue regime that 
might be introduced in Hong Kong. 
The major advantage of having such a 
regime on the books would be to 
encourage， if not force， reluctant 
credi tors to come to a negotia ted 
settlement. At present， under either 
informal workou ts or under the 
Hong Kong Approach to Corporate 
Difficulties， even where most creditors 
support a restructuring plan， one or 
two 'difficult' creditors can seriously 
ham per or even destroy a res仁ue.
Moreover， although the Hong Kong 
Approach does provide for the 
adoption of乱 standstil1， it does not 
include a moratorium that is binding 
on al cr正~ditors. A major advantage 
that would result from the enactment 
of provisional supervision is th孔tan 
obstinate creditor will have the ground 
cut from under his or her feet if the 
company can be placed into 
provisional supervision -for not only 
may that creditor's objections be 
defeated on a votc， but also， once 
provisional supervision has 
commenced， normal creditors' 
remedies will no longer be available 
Some might therefore argue that 
the details of the provisional 
supervision regimc proposed in the 
recent Companies (Amendment) Bill 
do not real1y matter that much， that 
，any statutory regime， whatever its 
! possible shortcomings and however 
Iitle it might be used in fact， is better 
than none. Although it would be 
tempting to agree， we cannot do so for 
the fol1owing r凶 sons:
， Secured creditors' rights should not 
be undermined to the extcnt 
apparently envisaged by the Bill. 
j.FOra附 C田 re句gim町netop 
1 Cα悦m州r陀旧凶ε以吋d…1孔山附u1凶古計叫仙山山山tけ山山ωha凶la¥品丸
in Jt仁， and estabフIishingcre正ditOI





































































































































9 l' As a 1'ule， a 1'escωregime should 
!削叩ifica山 alt白川)alance
of intercsts that prevails elsewhere 
in insolvency law 
When， as seems likcly， the 
government reconsiders the 
provisional superVlSlOn regime 
sometime later this year (or next ycar)， 
we would hope that these three points 
will be borne in mind and that any 
new bil wil1， at a minimum， include 
revisions to the provisions rピgarding
secured creditors， workers' wages and 
avoidance powers. The possibility that 
丘corporaterescue meじh白llismwill be 
introduced into Hong Kong law this 
year has evaporatcd目 Hopefully，the 
cffort next year wil1 bear fruit -if not， 




Ul/iversIty of HOl1g KυJlr 
臨時監管問題公司的制度
本身有何問題?


































主s第 rVB青[)ド的第 168ZQi際， 吹H特定的
千J保誇債機人 名為「主要債機人J-
有権否決臨時監管松序的~行 o 1"文"守'N
此作進一歩採あJ'仰木 fill分的若 II~馬ll 足:有























T寺池iI'帥 CIOO年六)J HONG KONG lAWYER JUN 200 55 
， ~-Qrporate'F12f.acliteo~"，.~去圏一山山町一……t'~Ti;;~:r~~mt.""，['f'I"" "i…一均一1~…叩明開閉叩明白
使合獲得通過。五ド例説，根楼一例J免主主













(例~Il要求所有債権人 1'1 動削減 Jl {責























従J}lJh¥ (10 'hf )伝来看，設立J免紋公司機jlV1手
許然同1，¥ヲ|入《平案》第 IVB古|川1減J員{J
保 J滞債権人 n~椴前，使是H Il :À 大代償。
筆者認1.:; ， ~MI 較好的!故法， j止在《被
告》有1( j字案)>J立雨端之!日j北山折衷的解
決)J1;- IL任 fiiJ 1J案 !Iヰ更改或損害釘1~~ ~\t 
債権人的資質村ri';i'該}J案謄f号到核{ff米
諸 {j'tm'人 n011~ 志， {I.(l能l句1;1流説明該 }J
家不合不公平地封待該有作，~ntl債権人，亦
イJ 合リ文字ミ iiln'J1~~誇{貞隣人 (10JJl討範囲 'Hリ
イく受1:述i>nililJ。











































































































































































































































(第 380 主主)一様設定某些 l-:I~ ，確定債
司{中出援手。(此タ卜，在述種情況下，貸 務的工作相信不曾那皮費時布l昂寅。
款人在臨時監管過程中不曾享有{1何優先 我例亦要問意， ~破産欠薪保障係例》
地位，定奥 A 般的清盤情況不同:見《公 業I香港清盤法律造成 f歪 11性的影響， ， 1('I 
司保例》第 265(2)il嫌。)第二，一些公司 《草案》建議設立的臨H寺存在管制度只合令
為了善措足鈎金銭以支付欠薪等債務，可 情況悪化。根嫁《破産欠薪保障僚例》第

























































を到臨 託戸口 l)g的款項;侍曾悠様。筆者不何倍在 ( j-，述闘表亦解樫"f為何在現1寺， ftl使公 例人向l頼償債5!:排't'!際 1'，相蛍竿見， Up使
宣散費 痘些情況下i雇員何百J従信託戸口取得所有 司己進行臼動i育盤ラ不少1雇貝 0'1尋求法律 :l.l現， Jifr牽渉的偏員数 1I日よ不曾;太多) 0 
1999 補償。不錯，該戸円郁為「信託戸口J' 援助以提:1強制清盤呈請:見 Rど Rピ1111 簡吉之，欠新基金己主t寄港的清盤法律主1
特祉: 但這不代表係員是f専統信託下的受益人 GllhrielHK Ltd [1995] 2 HKC 273 ~案。) 成歪1トド1:的影響，亦促使人例提出不必要》
距昭輔圃臨離韓関
J通
香港律帥て[;00年六月 HONG KONG lAWYER JUN 2∞ 57 
向精ur.PQ，a.tιl2r.oGti偽ぷF興一同一一一問問問問罫割問問…問問問問問問 明白 匝概要F潤
的清盤皇請，令他例招致無謂的関支 r(，i 嫁筆者了解，法改曾是刻意不建議把イJ 井)rM日1日gers(1996年)第 113頁) D 《草案》曾令情況悪化，更曾貞接損害- 公平優待方的!的廃止機flt展到臨時監管制
般債様人 (I~権採。筆者認為， {雇員在臨時 度的，砕lriu目安廃止楼可能舎{削01;些打算 結語
fo E主管手'tJデ展開前的欠薪巾索 ，HIF.輿係員在 イト公司接受臨時監管的董字削御歩;此 筆者頂期， 1Il使香港づ|人法定的公司挽救
強制i育権展開前的，[3索獲得相問的封待。 タトラ安在臨時監管期内行使廃止健赴殊ィ、 機制，成功的挽救行動也!I寺為数不多。{fl.



















我例可以説，不把燦[1:機flド展到臨H寺監 監符官条文的」何重大好慮，是一旦公可接 BilI Sl 任清除得一乾二濁。過去雨年来，例人自願
管制度的倣法，将千J助精簡監管程序布1提 受i主管，任何回執的債権人都禽被慮於劣 the d 
償債安扮 11乎意料地未能牧到頂期殺巣， t立
高臨時監管人的管芳H殺率。然而，以下各 勢 一 他 / 地 的 反 主J不但合干E投票時被-6' in H 
野~!示 f法定的債務重組機íIi~在債権人限中不
新1J、可用以駁斥信衛説法: 決， TM且蛍監管程序展開後，他/地也不 chan 
一定是簸丹妙薬。(英図柄15'港就個人無力
一、在絶大部分的個案中，案情都不合令 曾再百J以尋求正常的偵機人補救。 exten 
f賞u'i的法例大同小異，{rl.数字顎示，在失
人懐疑各)J行為是否正賞 o定様是 悶此種頗兵吸引力的説法是，我例 COVCl 
岡，大約lifJl:示破産佃案1'使千j一項伽|人自
百存在著燦 1上機可説是無関痛療的。 fJJ須過イ分県舎建議中的臨時監管制度的詳 as an 
願償f点安排;反と，在{}r佳，自従新的破産










規定タト， ~草案》並無賦予成 11:機。 now 
然i可 ， Vli案》亦住議修訂現行的 字、白保謎債権人的権益，不熔如《草 positi 清盤制度「有l譜共施J '終合戚得債権人
《公司僚例》第 J681僚，容許臨時股 案》所訂 Il))般被減損; of a 1 lJi大的f奇心布l支持。現H寺《草案》庭環有
管人イ象清雄人般向破産管理署署長翠 二、若要某挽救制度務揮作用，債権人使先 the v {米被債権人有I仮員的か式，奥羽存的清盤
報任何不通省的行為， I可這些資料将 要封該制度千jイ古心;而建立這種信心， putc 法律 1'.各方的利益和平衡背道而馳;而
fj~m在取消董事資俗的研訊程jy. 蛍 日暮優先於迎合公司董事的喜好平日可容忍 cash 《草案》慮理公HJ電事的えrm 也弁!~助於榊
'1。故此，若出現1i事優待有聯繋人 程度; to du 強債権人封建議1'制度的信心。
XVa 
1~品若公可進行消総程序， i古殿人;持獲賦 1:或違反受信責任的情況，臨時監管 三、原則上，挽救制度不熔令現行消椴拡; dire( 
f'某些額タト的貿質権利或程序上的優勢， 人穎然不能坐視不sI!。 律ド各方権首的平衡出現重大政幾。 puq: 
以封{、J1!!~ 良的公司輩司王。《公司{康例》包 三、最重要的是，臨時監管人将要告ま1債 政府f艮有可能於本年梢後時間或l列年重 Sepa 
合了候文1是埋不公平優待、市H'F性的存f貸 機人他1r~:(EJ免救公司方案下可期望得 新審議《草案》所建議的臨時監管制度。 disd 
交易、}欽許符jli及不法行為的法律程序等 到的補償以及他例在正常清盤科序下 筆者紛望政府到時曾顧及以上三新，以及 an ec 
1r宜，預言!於灼J&J内還曾加入係文以jMs! Tift切望得到的補償，以作比較。在消 《革案》内I凋於有保護債権人、健員薪金 (sucl 
以低於J;t:偵f直進行的交易。法改曾在《報 路程序中ラ廃止機;1守合適用。正刻1-. 布l藤止機的保文得到修訂。 :(E本年内引入 SettlE 
jlj.)内木有建議l旬臨時監管人賦予療止 イセ英;陸!銀行家曽経指出: 臨時監管制度的じ成不可能，筆者期紛l河 pure 
機，而.H1E第 13.19段建議就 {N(案》第 債権人;1ヰ需要得到非常確賓的 年曾有成果， jujイJ是再度把事件・再抱延
per c 
fIuct1 168ZQ 僚がj否決櫨r(ijF，賦子機力，1;:許廃 保設，即監管人;1守~公司的整健債権 甚宅令官無疾j(rj終。
notif 




動11ド記 ，fH不包j舌一)化 該J良tlf'記設 ì，~盤情 ìX， I'"TIJ受到消盤人厳脳主主難， P 
定之H、F或之後文十l予公司作為該項jlf記的 債権人無疑也不合干ri'F該等交易和:fI deri、
代{買的現金款Jff;及(二)利息。核項建 為被地諸J雨後。 J (見 E a 1 e s 若 I'hili P Smart輿布卓利 diff正
議己枕納入 ~11立案》第 168ZQ(4) 係。 IlsoIZ'clcy: A Pl日正Ifc日1Lrgll Halldbook 在香港大翠法律系教授清盤法 trans 
cash 
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